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We try to explain the strange behavior for suppliers of books or
softwares which release the cheap(paperback) edition of their products
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this article is to explain the strange behavior for suppliers
of books or softwares which release the cheap(or, paperback) edition of their
products only when this product has a good sale1. The cost to release the
cheap(paperback) edition is usually very cheaper than to create their new
product2, so they can get new profit even if this cheap edition sells only a
thausand copies. Therefore, this behavior is strange and seems to $co$ntradict
1The term “greatest hits” means the series of the cheap edition of the Sony PlayStation’s
softwares.
2So we can assume its cost is approximately $0$ .
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the profit-maximization behavior of suppliers. If they are rational, then they
must release the cheap edition of “every” products3.
This paper tries to explain its behavior and to show that this strange
behavior of suppliers does not necessarily mean their irrational choice. The
basic idea is here; if they always release the cheap edition, then most con-
sumers wait for the release of cheap edition and tends to not buy it. So
that, to control such waiting behavior, supplier does not release the cheap
edition when his product does not have a good sale. In other words, suppliers
exchange the long-run profit for short-run profit.
To express this idea, we use a dynamic system similar to the replicator
dynamics of a strategic form game represents this situation, except the sup-
plier’s behavior is biased so that he tends to not release the cheap edition
when many consumers wait for it. We show that if this bias is sufficiently
high, then supplier’s payoff may be improved than his bias is $0$ .
Compared to other alternative explanations(especially using the folk the-
orem), this explanation has some virtues. First, this explanation need not
require the clever action of consumers. Second, supplier’s decision process
to realize the long-run equilibrium emerges specifically, and matches actual
behavior. So this explanation is better than the others.
In section 2, we display our model and derive the result of this model.
Section 3 is the concluding remarks.
2 Model and result
We constracts a strategic form game below;
and a dynamic system;
$\dot{x}/x=(1-x)[(u-p_{H})-y(d-p_{L})])$
$\dot{y}/y=(1-y)[(1-x)p_{L}+D]-b(1-x)$ .
3Moreover, we can argue that the motivation to release the cheap edition of a product
which has a good sale is smaller than which does not have a good sale, because in the latter
case this product has missed relatively large potential demand. Although this argument
seems to have some persuasive power, it completely contradicts the actual behavior of
suppliers.
153
If $b=0$ , then this system is equal to the replicator dynamics of above game.
We assume $p_{H}>p_{L}>0,$ $d-p_{L}>u-p_{H}>0,$ $D>0$ .
The interpretation of these models is here: player 1 represents a consumer
and player 2 represents a supplier. Player 1 considers whether he buys a
product immediately. If he gets it immediately, then he gains $u$ . If not, he
waits for the release of the cheap edition of this product. If player 2 releases
the cheap edition, player 1 can get it and gain $d$ . If he does not release it,
then player 1 waits until this product becomes old-fashioned and the worth
of it tends to $0$ . $p_{H}$ denotes the original retail price of this product, and $p_{L}$
denotes the price of cheap edition. So we assume $p_{H}>p_{L}>0$ .
If $u-p_{H}\geq d-p_{L}$ , then consumer should buy immediately. Such consumer
must not relate the determination of release of cheap edition, so we assume
$d-p_{L}>u-p_{H}$ . Moreover, if $u-p_{H}\leq 0$ , then he should wait for cheap edition.
Such consumer’s behavior is so simple that we treat it only implicitly and
assume if player 2 does not release the cheap edition, then he automatically
$loses-D<0$ , the sales of such consumer. Therefore, we treat only the case
$d-p_{L}>u-p_{H}>0$ .
The replicator dynamics of this game represents the short-run behavior of
players. At first, both players blindly believe their current action is the best.
As time goes by, however, they may observe their action is not the best and
change it. Changing action occurs in proportion to the difference between
the payoff of current action and of social average. So both the growth rate
of the proportion of the people buying immediately(denoted by x) and of






Finally, the term $-b(1-x)$ represents supplier’s decision is biased in the
sense that if $x$ is large and his product does not have a good sale, then he
does not release the cheap edition.
Then we get a result below;
proposition 1 (1)If $b \leq\frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$ then any solution
4We interpret $x$ as the proportion of the consumer choosing $B$ and $y$ as the probability
that supplier chooses to release cheap edition. So in our model, the interpretation of mixed
strategy of each player is different.
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$(x, y)(t)$ of this dynamic system passing through the interior of $[0,1]\cross[0,1]$
converges to $(x^{*}, y^{*})=(0, \frac{p_{L}-b+D}{p_{L}+D})$ .
(2) $Ifb>\frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$ then this dynamic system has an
asymptotically stable equilibrium point such that,
$(x^{*}, y^{*})=( \ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}})$ .
The implication of this proposition is here. (1) means if supplier’s choice
is not biased(that is, $b=0$)) then he tends always to release the cheap
edition and consumers tend always to wait for release of it. We call this
result the short-run equilibrium5. In contrast, (2) means if supplier’s choice
is sufficiently biased, then it is possible that a certain number of consumers
buy immediately. Moreover, this equilibrium point converges to $(1,$ $\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}})$
as $barrow+\infty$ , and the payoff of supplier converges to $p_{H}- \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}D$ . If
$D$ is sufficiently small, its payoff is larger than $p_{L}$ , the payoff of short-run
equilibrium. So we can conclude that if $D$ is sufficiently small, supplier’s
biased decision may improve long-run payoff.
proof Suppose $(x, y)(t)$ is the solution and $(x, y)(t^{*})$ is in the interior of
$[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ . At first, we confirm $(x, y)(t)$ is extendable on [$t^{*},$ $+\infty$ [ and
$(x, y)(t)\in[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ for every $t\geq t^{*}$ .
Clearly, $(x, y)(t)$ is the solution of the dynamic system below;
$\dot{x}$ $=$ $x(1-x)[(u-p_{H})-y(d-p_{L})]$ ,
$\dot{y}$ $=$ $y[(1-y)[(1-x)p_{L}+D]-b(1-x)]$ ,
where the right-hand side is defined on $\mathbb{R}^{2}$ . As is well known, if $(x, y)(t)$
is not extendable on [$t^{*},$ $+\infty$ [, there has to be $t\geq t^{*}$ such that $(x, y)(t)\not\in$
$[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ . Therefore, it suffices to show that $(x, y)(t)\in[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ for
all $t\geq t^{*}$ .
Suppose $x(t)\leq 0$ for some $t>t^{*}$ . Then we have $x(t’)=0$ for some
$t’\in[t^{*}, t]$ and thus $x\equiv 0$ , implying $x(t^{*})=0$ , a contradiction. So we have
$x(t)>0$ for all $t>t^{*}$ . Similarly, we get $x(t)<1$ and $y(t)>0$ for all $t>t^{*}$ .
Next, suppose $y(t)>1$ for some $t>t^{*}$ . Let $\overline{t}$ is the maximal element of the
5In fact, the point $(0,1)$ represents the only Nash equilibrium of this game.
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nonempty set $\{t’\in[t^{*})t]|y(t)=1\}$ . If $b>0$ , we have $\dot{y}(t$] $=-b(1-x(t])<0$ ,
so that, there exists $\hat{t}\in$ ] $\overline{t}$) $t$ [ such that $y(\hat{t})<1$ . Hence we have there exists
$t’\in]\hat{t},$ $t$ [ such that $y(t’)=1$ , contradicting the definition of $\overline{t}$. If $b=0$ , we
have $y\equiv 1$ and thus $y(t)=1$ , a contradiction. So we must have $(x, y)(t)$ is
extendable on $[t^{*},$ $+\infty[$ .
(1) We separates this situation into three cases; I) $b=0$ , II) $0<b<$
$\frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$ 1II) $b= \frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$ .
Figure 1: $b=0$ .
Case I: Assume $b=0$ . Then, we have $y(t)$ increases whenever $y(t)\in$ ] $0,1[$ ,
and thus $y(t)$ converges to $y^{*}= \sup y([t^{*}, +\infty[)\in[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ . If $y^{*}<1$ ,
$\dot{y}(t)=y(t)(1-y(t))[(1-x(t))p_{L}+D]\geq y(t^{*})(1-y^{*})D>0$ ,
for all $t\geq t^{*}$ , so that, $y(t)arrow+\infty$ as $tarrow\infty$ , a contradiction. So $y^{*}=1$ .
Therefore, we must have there exists $\overline{t}\geq t^{*}$ such that $0<x(t5<1$ and
$y(t$] $> \frac{u}{d}-pg-p_{L}$ Hence we have $\dot{x}(t)<0$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$ and thus $x(t)$ converges to
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$x^{*}= \inf x([\overline{t}, +\infty[)$ . If $x^{*}>0$ ,
$\dot{x}(t)$ $=$ $x(t)(1-x(t))[(u-p_{H})-y(t)(d-p_{L})]$
$\leq$ $x^{*}(1-x(t\gamma)[u-p_{H}-y(t](d-p_{L})]<0$ ,
for all $t\geq\overline{t}$, so that, $x(t)arrow-\infty$ as $tarrow\infty$ , a contradiction. So $x^{*}=0$ .
This completes the proof of case I.
Figure 2: $0<b< \frac{(p_{L}+D)((d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H}))}{d-p_{L}}$
Case II: Assume $0<b< \frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$
See figure 2. We separates $[0,1]\cross[0,1]$ into three areas. Area A is
separated from area $B$ by the $\dot{x}=0$ line, and area $B$ is separated from area.
$C$ by the $\dot{y}=0$ curve. We can easily check that
$\dot{x}=0\Leftrightarrow y=\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ ,
$\dot{y}=0\Leftrightarrow y=\frac{(1-x)(p_{L}-b)+D}{(1-x)p_{L}+D}\equiv g(x)$ .
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By easy computation, we have
$g’(x)= \frac{bD}{((1-x)p_{L}+D)^{2}}>0$ ,
$g”(x)= \frac{2bDp_{L}}{((1-x)p_{L}+D)^{3}}>0$ ,
whenever $x<1$ . Note that $g( O)=\frac{p_{L}-b+D}{p_{L}+D}$ .
Now, we will show that every solution passing through area A must enter
area B. In fact,
$\dot{y}(t)$ $\geq$ $y(t^{*})[ \frac{(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})}{(d-p_{L})}[(1-x(t))p_{L}+D]-b(1-x(t))]$
$>$ $y(t^{*})x(t)D \frac{(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})}{d-p_{L}}$
$\geq$ $y(t^{*})x(t^{*})D \frac{(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})}{d-p_{L}}>0$ ,
whenever $y(t) \leq\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ So we must nave $y(t)> \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ for some $t\geq t^{*}$ .
Next, we will show that every solution passing through area $B$ must not
reenter area A. Suppose $(x, y)(t^{*})$ is in area $B$ and $(x,y)(t)$ is in area A for
some $t>t^{*}$ . Then $y(t^{*})> \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}>y(t)$ . Define $\overline{t}=\sup\{t’\in[t^{*}, t]|y(t’)=$
$\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}\}$ . Then $\dot{y}(\overline{t}>0$ , implying $y(t’)> \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ for some $t’\in[\overline{t},t]$ and thus
$y(t”)= \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ for some $t”\in$ ] $\overline{t},$ $t$], a contradiction.
Therefore, we have there exists $\overline{t}$ such that $\dot{x}(t)<0$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$ and thus
$x(t)$ converges to $x^{*}= \inf x([\overline{t}, +\infty[)$ .
Suppose $(x, y)(t)$ belongs to neither area $C$ nor the curve $\{(x, g(x))|x\in$
$[0,1]\}$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$. Then $\dot{y}(t)>0$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$ and thus $y(t)$ converges to
$y^{*}= \sup y([\overline{t}, +\infty[)$ . Suppose $x^{*}>0$ . Then,
$\dot{x}(t)\leq x^{*}(1-x(t\gamma)[(u-p_{H})-y(t=)(d-p_{L})]<0$ ,
for all $t\geq\overline{t}$. Hence we must have $x(t)arrow-\infty$ .as $tarrow\infty$ , a contradiction.
So we have $x^{*}=0$ . Since $(x, y)(t)$ never belongs to area $C$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$, we
must have $y^{*}\leq g(O)$ . Suppose $y^{*}<g(O)$ . Define
$s^{*}= \inf\{(1-y)((1-x)p_{L}+D)-b(1-x)|x\in[0,1],$ $y \in[\frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}},$ $y^{*]}\}$ .
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Figure 3: $b= \frac{(p_{L}+D)((d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H}))}{d-p_{L}}$ .
Since $y^{*}<g(O)$ and $g’(x)>0$ for all $x<1$ , we must have $s^{*}>0$ and
thus $\dot{y}(t)\geq y(t$]$s^{*}>0$ for all $t\geq\overline{t}$, implying $y(t)arrow+\infty$ as $tarrow\infty$ , a
contradiction.
Lastly, we treat the case there exists $\hat{t}$ such that $(x, y)(t)$ is in area C.
We will show that $(x, y)(t)$ stays at area $C$ whenever $t\geq\hat{t}$. Suppose on the
contrary $(x, y)(t)$ is in area $B$ for some $t\geq\hat{t}$ . Let $t\sim$ be the greatest element
of $\{t’\in[\hat{t}, t]|\dot{y}(t’)=0\}$ . Then we must have $\dot{x}(t)\sim<0$ and thus there exists
$t’\in]tt]\sim$, such that $\dot{y}(t’)<0$ . Since $\dot{y}(t)>0$ , there exists ’ $\in$ ] $t,$ $t$]
$\sim$
such that
$\dot{y}(t^{u})=0$ , contradicting the definition of $t\sim$.
So we have $(x, y)(t)$ is in area $C$ for all $t\geq\hat{t}$ . Therefore, we must have
$\dot{x}(t)<0$ and $\dot{y}(t)<0$ whenever $t\geq\hat{t}$ , and thus $(x, y)(t)arrow(x^{*}, y^{*})$ , where
$x^{*}= \inf x([\hat{t}, +\infty[)$ and $y^{*}= \inf y([\hat{t}, +\infty[)$ . We can easily check that $x^{*}=0$
and $y^{*}\geq g(O)$ . Suppose $y^{*}>g(O)$ . Then there exists $t\sim\geq\hat{t}$ such that
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$y^{*}\geq x(t)\sim$ . Define
$s^{*}= \sup\{(1-y)((1-x)p_{L}+D)-b(1-x)|x\in[0, x(t)], y\in\sim[y^{*}, 1]\}$ .
Then $s^{*}<0$ and thus $\dot{y}(t)\leq y^{*}s^{*}<0$ for all $t\geq t\sim$, implying $y(t)arrow-\infty$ as
$tarrow\infty$ , a contradiction.
Case III: Assume $b= \frac{(p_{L}+D)[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}$ .
The difference from case II is where the $\dot{y}=0$ curve closses the $\dot{x}=0$ line
at $x=0$ . By the similar argument on case II, we can show that there exists
$\hat{t}>t^{*}$ such that $(x, y)(t)$ is in area C. The rest of the proof is the same as
the last part of the proof of case II.
(2) Since $(x^{*})y^{*})$ is a solution of $g(x)= \frac{u-p_{H}}{d-p_{L}}$ , we must have $\dot{x}=\dot{y}=0$ at
$(x^{*}, y^{*})$ . So it suffices to show that $(x^{*}, y^{*})$ is asymptotically stable. To do
this, it suffices to show that for every eigenvalue $\lambda$ of the Jacobian matrix, its
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real part is negative. Since $\dot{x}=0$ and $\dot{y}=0$ at $(x^{*}, y^{*})$ , its Jacobian matrix
at $(x^{*}, y^{*})$ is
$(y^{*}[b-(1-y^{*})p_{L}]0$ $-y^{*}((1-x^{*})p_{L}+D)-x^{*}(1-x^{*})(d-p_{L}))$
and thus, its characteristic equation is
$\lambda^{2}+y^{*}((1-x^{*})p_{L}+D)\lambda+x^{*}(1-x^{*})y^{*}(d-p_{L})[b-(1-y^{*})p_{L}]=0$.
Let $\lambda_{1},$ $\lambda_{2}$ be the solution of this equation. Then,
$\lambda_{1}+\lambda_{2}=-y^{*}((1-x^{*})p_{L}+D)<0$ ,
$\lambda_{1}\lambda_{2}=x^{*}(1-x^{*})y^{*}(d-p_{L})[b-(1-y^{*})p_{L}]$ .
Note that, if $\lambda_{1}$ is not a real number, then $\overline{\lambda}_{1}=\lambda_{2}$ and $\lambda_{1}+\lambda_{2}<0$ , so the
real part of $\lambda_{1},$ $\lambda_{2}$ must be less than $0$ . So we can suppose $\lambda_{1},$ $\lambda_{2}\in \mathbb{R}$ without
loss of generality. Then,
$b-(1-y^{*})p_{L}> \frac{D[(d-p_{L})-(u-p_{H})]}{d-p_{L}}>0$ ,
implying $\lambda_{1},$ $\lambda_{2}<0$ . It completes the proof. $\blacksquare$
3 Concluding remarks
We try to explain the strange behavior for suppliers of books or softwares
which release the cheap edition of their products only when this product has
a good sale, and show that if supplier’s short-run decision is biased, then his
long-run payoff may improve. So suppliers need not be irrational, and his
strange behavior may improve his payoff.
To conclude above, we used a dynamic system similar to the replicator
dynamics of a strategic form game represents this situation, except the sup-
plier’s behavior is biased. Compared to alternative explanations(especially,
using the folk theorem), this explanation has some virtues. First, this expla-
nation need not require the clever action of consumers. Second, supplier’s
decision process to realize the long-run equilibrium emerges specifically, and
matches actual behavior. So this explanation is better than the others.
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